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Abstract
The main purpose of this paper is to refute the metaphysicians ‘method-
ological continuation’ argument supporting epistemic realism in meta-
physics. This argument aims to show that scientific realists have to accept
that metaphysics is as rationally justified as science given that they both
employ inference to the best explanation, i.e. that metaphysics and science
are methodologically continuous. I argue that the reasons given by scien-
tific realists as to why inference to the best explanation (IBE) is reliable
in science do not constitute a reason to believe that it is reliable in meta-
physics. The justification of IBE in science and the justification of IBE in
metaphysics are two distinct issues with only superficial similarities, and
one cannot rely on one for the other. This becomes especially clear when
one analyses the debate about the legitimacy of IBE that has taken place
between realists and empiricists. The metaphysician seeking to piggyback
on the realist defense of IBE in science by the methodological continuation
argument presupposes that the defense is straightforwardly applicable to
metaphysics. I will argue that it is, in fact, not. The favoured defenses of
IBE in scientific realism make extensive use of empirical considerations,
predictive power and inductive evidence, all of which are paradigmati-
cally absent in the metaphysical context. Furthermore, I argue that the
metaphysician, even if the realist would concede to the methodological
continuation argument, fails to offer any agreed upon conclusions result-
ing from its application in metaphysics. As a result, the scientific realist
is not committed to believing that there is metaphysical knowledge.
1 Introduction
Scientific realists think that we can have knowledge about unobservables entities
such as electrons, atoms, and cells. One of the ways that realists have suggested
we can gain this knowledge is via explanatory inference, or inference to the best
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explanation.1 If the existence of the unobservable entities feature indispensably
in science’s most empirically successful theories, we can justifiably believe in
them, meaning that electrons, atoms, and cells are ontologically robust entities
that we can have knowledge about. Most notably, this kind of realism has been
explicated by Boyd (1983) and Musgrave (1988) and defended by Psillos (1999)
and Kitcher (2001, 1995). Metaphysicians’ have argued that since they also
employ inference to the best explanation, they are similarly justified in believing
in the existence of abstract unobservable entities (Paul (2012), Lyon (2012),
Colyvan (2012), Swoyer (2008)). The metaphysicians gambit centers around
methodological continuation: if scientific realists are justified in employing IBE
to acquire knowledge about the unobservable parts of the world posited by
science, metaphysicians who employ IBE must be similarly justified with respect
to theories in metaphysics. The essential move in this strategy is to couple the
defense of IBE in metaphysics to the success of the scientific realist endeavor to
defend IBE in science against the anti-realist. I argue against this strategy.
My argument aims to show that the justification of IBE in science and the
justification of IBE in metaphysics are two separate problems. The metaphysi-
cian needs these issues to be sufficiently similar in order for the methodological
continuation argument to work. By tracking the dynamics of the debate regard-
ing the justification of IBE in the literature on scientific realism, it becomes clear
that any similarities between the two endeavors are superficial at best. I outline
the dialectic in the debate on the justification of IBE with respect to scien-
tific realism and evaluate the prospect of the metaphysicians ability to apply
the realist arguments and strategies to the justification of IBE in metaphysics.
As will become apparent, the metaphysician can, with the help of an unlikely
ally, resist the separation of the issues at great length, but will ultimately have
to abandon this strategy. The simple reason for this is that in the quest of
convincing its empiricist antagonist, scientific realist defenses have become in-
creasingly empirical. The core issues in the debate on the justification of IBE
in science has shifted from problems in the logical structure of arguments de-
fending IBE to instead revolving around the constructive empiricist epistemic
divide between observables and unobservables. The empiricist/realist debate
on that divide is of course entirely orthogonal to the question of the reliability
of IBE in metaphysics. In an additional argument I show that even under the
supposition that the methodological continuation argument works, the meta-
physician cannot plausibly argue that we have metaphysical knowledge since
there is no consensus amongst metaphysicians regarding which theories that
provide the best explanations. That is, even if the scientific realist concedes
that metaphysicians have a legitimate methodology, they seem unable to offer
any cohesive results about what, exactly, we ought to be realists about. This lack
of consensus suggests that the underlying problem in metaphysics is the absence
of external methodological validation. Since there is no neutral, or additional,
methodological vantage point from which to evaluate or assess the success of
IBE in metaphysics, metaphysicians can only rely on a priori judgements to do




The epistemic credentials of metaphysics has recently seen some heavy criticism.
Ladyman and Ross writes that ‘Standard analytic metaphysics [...] contributes
nothing to human knowledge’. (2007, 1) Saatsi is less harsh but states that ‘[i]n
the virtual absence of experiments, predictions, and empirical feedback, it is
far from clear how metaphysical theories and views can be rationally justified’.
(2017, 163) Attempting to defend the epistemic status of metaphysics from
worries like the above, one naturalist strategy seeks vindication by invoking
methodological similarity, the starting point of which is the observation that
explanatory inferences are used in science, scientific realism, and metaphysics.
Here, Colyvan (2006) employs the methodological continuation argument as a
justification for mathematical realism:
[I]nference to the best explanation is a special case of the indispens-
ability argument. Moreover, as has already been noted, this is a style
of argument that the scientific realist accepts. [...] So here I will take
the indispensability argument to be an argument that puts pressure
on the marriage of scientific realism and nominalism. It does this
because the style of argument is one which scientific realists already
endorse. (Colyvan 2006, 227-8)
The last sentence makes an appeal to something like methodological similar-
ity. Colyvan says that indispensability arguments (for mathematical realism)
are vindicated by the fact that they are instances of IBE, an accepted rule
of inference in the methodology of scientific realism. Another argument for
methodological continuity comes from Swoyer (2008). Swoyer does not think
that metaphysical explanations ‘are as deep or nuanced or successful as most
explanations in chemistry or physics or physiology’, but he maintains that the
connection between explanation and truth is sufficiently strong to propose that
‘Something similar can occur in philosophy.’ (2008, 17) Drawing on this alleged
similarity of methodology his suggestion is that:
[w]e should (re)construe arguments for the existence of abstract enti-
ties as inferences to the best overall available ontological explanation.
(Swoyer 2008, 17)
Paul (2012) has given the argument its most developed defence, explicitly draw-
ing on methodological continuation in defending the epistemic status of meta-
physics:2
2Brenner (2017) defends a modest version of this claim, focusing on simplicity. While
simplicity is sometimes thought of as one of the guiding virtues of IBE, it is more useful to
focus on IBE in general, setting aside the question about the specifics of theoretical virtues.
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If [...] theoretical desiderata are truth conducive in science, they
are also truth conducive in metaphysics (and in mathematics, and
in other areas). The main point I want to make here is that if the
method can lead us closer to the truth in science, it can lead us closer
to the truth in metaphysics. [...] This is a central part of my thesis:
if we accept inference to the best explanation in ordinary reason-
ing and in scientific theorizing, we should accept it in metaphysical
theorizing. (Paul 2012, 21-2)
The general argument metaphysicians have given for methodological continua-
tion can be outlined as a modus ponens:
(1) If IBE is truth-conducive in science, then it’s truth-conducive in meta-
physics.
(2) IBE is truth-conducive in science.
∴ IBE in metaphysics is truth-conducive.
Paul argues that an upshot of the methodological continuation argument is
that it forces a naturalistic scientific realist to endorse the view ‘that doing
metaphysics, and philosophy more generally, is a rational and reasonable way
to try to discover fundamental and general truths about the world.’ (Paul 2012,
25) While the argument is logically valid, and builds on the fact that scientific
realists accept (2) and the antecedent in (1), I will argue that realists have no
reason to believe that (1) is true, since the reasons they have for believing in
the antecedent are not reasons for believing in the consequent.
In applying the strategy of methodological continuation, the metaphysician
relies on sharing the same fate as the realist with respect to the epistemic
status of IBE - metaphysicians and realists succeed together, or fail together.
This means that whatever argument, defense, gambit or strategy that realists
utilize against its opponents, metaphysicians better hope that it applies, mutatis
mutandis, to metaphysics as well. As we will see, this is not the case. It
is important to note that I do not argue against the possibility that IBE is
truth-conducive in metaphysics. The main take-away point is that the problem
of justifying IBE in metaphysics and the problem of justifying IBE in science
aren’t sufficiently similar in order to establish the truth of (1).
3 Defending IBE
Many scientific realists believe that IBE can deliver the truth about unobserv-
ables posited in scientific theories. In other words, scientific realists believe that
IBE is truth-conducive in science. What reasons do realists have for thinking
that this is so? In the 1980’s, Boyd (1983, 1980) used a refined no-miracles
argument to defend scientific realism. Boyd’s argument is that the success of
theory-driven scientific methodology is best explained by the truth of the the-
ories which the methodology relies upon. Fine (1991) rejects the strategy of
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defending scientific realism by using IBE, claiming it to be question-begging
and viciously circular:
[...] we can challenge whether any explanationist defense of realism
is reasonable in the context of a debate over the reliability of the
hypothetical method. For the issue under discussion in judging real-
ism in this debate is precisely whether explanatory success provides
grounds for belief in the truth of the explanatory story. To use ex-
planatory success to ground belief in realism, as the explanationist
defense does, is to employ the very type of argument whose cogency
is the question under discussion. In this light the explanationist
defense seems a paradigm case of begging the question, involving a
circularity so small as to make its viciousness apparent. (Fine 1991,
82)
According to Fine, the ‘ground-level’ IBE that is used in science cannot be
defended by making an argument that depends on ‘meta-level’ IBE. Fine’s ar-
gument against realism is compatible with the metaphysician strategy: if Fine is
right, then realists cannot use Boyd’s version of NMA to defend IBE in science,
and so cannot separate the issue from IBE in metaphysics. According to Fine,
the realist must endorse her position on the very same metaphysical grounds as
the metaphysician.
The debate over whether or not Fine is correct (and consequently whether or
not (2) is true) is precisely the debate between scientific realists and empiricists
over the reliability of IBE. A lot has happened in this debate since the early
90’s, where arguments for the reliability of IBE in science offered by the realist
has been given in response to empiricist worries. It is unsurprising, then, that
realists have tried to argue for the justification of IBE in ways that they hope
would convince an empiricist. While this fact alone might seem worrying for
the plausibility of the methodological continuation argument, I will review two
approaches to defend IBE in science and assess whether the reasons given for
the truth of (2) are also reasons to think that (1) is true.
3.1 The explanationist defense of IBE
As stated above, Boyd (1980, 1983) provided several different versions of the
no-miracles argument defending scientific realism which relied on IBE. Real-
ism about scientific theories, Boyd claims, is the only scientifically plausible
explanation for the instrumental reliability of scientific methodology. Boyd’s
refinement of the NMA focuses on the empirical success of theory-driven sci-
entific methodology. The best scientific explanation for this methodological
success is, according to Boyd, scientific realism. The criticism from Fine stated
that this particular way of defending IBE is viciously circular. Psillos (1999,
2007, 2009) mitigates the impact of this objection by distinguishing between
premise-circularity and rule-circularity, and proceeds to develop the explana-
tionist defense of IBE for scientific realism based on novel empirical success. If
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we suppose, in line with Psillos, that rule-circularity is benign, we may assess if
the explanationist defense of IBE gives us reason to believe that (1) is true.3
A telling aspect of the explanationist defense of IBE that makes (1) implau-
sible is that it takes the justification of IBE to be an a posteriori, empirically
informed, process. The fact that scientific methodology is theory-laden and en-
joys predictive and instrumental success is what gives us reason to believe that
those theories we use in order to arrive at empirical success are (approximately)
true. The relevant explanatory connection that the explanationist defense tries
to establish is that between (novel) empirical success and truth. Only if the
theory under consideration is empirically successful can one legitimately infer
its truth. It’s hard to imagine what (if any) metaphysical theory can be consid-
ered empirically successful, at least not under any definition of empirical success
given by scientific realists.4 The explanationist defense of IBE shows that the
issue of justifying IBE in science is profoundly different from justifying IBE in
metaphysics, and therefore that the consequent does not follow from the an-
tecedent in (1). However, given that the explanatory defense of IBE itself relies
on IBE, this defense is going to be dialectically inefficient against those who
deny the legitimacy of IBE in the first place, i.e. empiricists. In an interesting
turn of events, it would appear as if the metaphysician can utilize the empiricist
arguments against the realist defense of IBE in so far as that particular defense
is not also applicable to IBE in metaphysics. For the metaphysician, the enemy
of their enemy is (sometimes) a friend. The metaphysicians strategy may then
be, with respect to any realist defense of IBE, to first identify if the defense is
applicable to IBE in metaphysics. If the realist defense of IBE is applicable to
IBE in metaphysics, the methodological continuation argument is successful and
metaphysicians can take part in a joint strategy with realists to argue for that
particular defense of IBE against empiricists. If the realist defense is not ap-
plicable to IBE in metaphysics, the methodological continuation argument fails
and metaphysicians can take part in a joint strategy with empiricists to reject
that particular defense of IBE. Since the explanationist defense is not applicable
to IBE in metaphysics, realists can refute the methodological continuation ar-
gument, forcing the metaphysician to side with the empiricist. Metaphysicians
will then quickly point to the dialectical issue in the explanationist defense as
the reason for not defending IBE in this particular way. Their reason for doing
this being motivated by the fact that the explanationist defense, by virtue of its
essentially empirical approach, is inapplicable to IBE in metaphysics.
3.2 The inductive defense of IBE
Another realist strategy to defend the reliability of IBE in science is to invoke
inductive evidence.5 According to this defense, we have reason to believe in the
3From an empiricist point of view, one may not so easily concede that rule-circularity
is benign, but for the present purposes, the question of viciousness is orthogonal. For an
evaluation of rule-circularity and IBE, see Carter and Pritchard (2017).
4For realist definitions of empirical success, see Psillos (1999) and Kitcher (1995).
5See Douven (2002), and Harré (1986) for inductive approaches to defend IBE.
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reliability of IBE in science because IBE has proven to be reliable in science in
the past. This type of defense seeks to establish reliability by finding successful
instances of explanatory reasoning and inference in the history of science. Again,
this kind of defense has been developed in order to convince empiricists on
empiricist terms. Bird (2006) offers an inductive approach which he hopes will
convince the empiricist of the reliability of IBE with respect to the unobservables
that realists regularly argues that we ought to believe in:
[Explanatory] inferences to the existence of unobservables have later
been verified by direct observation once observational techniques
have improved. We can now observe microbes and molecules, the
existence of which was once a purely theoretical, explanatory hy-
pothesis. (Bird 2006, 160)
Bird’s inductive defense builds on the fact that we can confirm if past inferences
in science were successful by later observation (or detection) of the inferred
objects. This defense of IBE is, precisely as the explanationist defense, primarily
focused on taking an empirical approach sufficient for purposes of convincing the
empiricist. The empirical data is gained by verifying the explanatory inferences
made in science by means of detecting the inferred objects.
Is Bird’s argument for IBE applicable to metaphysics? Given the empirical
nature of the strategy and the scope of induction, it’s hard to see how it could be.
If successful, Bird’s argument does not conclude that IBE is truth-conducive in
the general way that is required for methodological continuation. The argument
claims that explanatory inferences to unobservables in science are justified be-
cause explanatory inferences to unobservables in science have been empirically
confirmed by detecting the inferred objects. The argument could even take a
more local scope such that successful empirical confirmation of explanatory in-
ferences in a specific scientific discipline justifies that inferential practice in only
that discipline. Novick (2017) argues, building on Norton (Forthcoming), that
this kind of local justification for inferences threatens methodological continua-
tion:
If justification is local in this way, then the successful reliance on a
theoretical virtue in a particular scientific context cannot support
reliance on that virtue in metaphysics, unless it can be shown that
the justification transfers across contexts. (Novick 2017, 1172)
The metaphysician cannot assume that evidence for the reliability of IBE in one
context is evidence for the reliability of IBE in any context. To be clear, it is
certainly possible for this to be the case, but it has to be argued, not merely
assumed. The burden of proof is on the metaphysician to demonstrate that the
reliability of IBE is invariant with respect to its application in metaphysics or
science.
There are at least two ways for the metaphysician to proceed: the first
is to find empirically confirmed successful applications of IBE in metaphysics
(without assuming that they are successful - begging the question in precisely
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the way Fine worries about); the second is to show that the demonstrated
justification of IBE is non-local to the scientific discipline in particular or to
science in general.
As a means to show the former, the metaphysician can refer to the fact that
the metaphysical theory of atomism developed by ancient Greek philosopher
Democritus was confirmed empirically by the experiments of Perrin in 1908.
While this case may carry some resemblance to an inductive defense of IBE,
the claim that Democritus’ method was anything like IBE, more than merely
a possible theory in logical space, is implausible. That Democritus’ theorising
was sufficiently similar to modern metaphysics is also highly implausible. Even
worse, the two aspects of Democritus’ theory that was decidedly metaphysical
both look questionable at best in light of modern physics. First, elementary
particles in quantum field theory are not the eternal and indivisible ‘atoms’
of Democritus’ theory, but can be annihilated and transformed into different
particles. Second, the vacuum of quantum field theory is a dynamical and fluc-
tuating system, in no way resembling anything like Democritus’ empty space.
That is, the only two aspects of the theory that was metaphysical in spirit, was
precisely the aspects that subsequently became refuted. The empirical investi-
gations that in all likelihood informed Democritus to his conclusion - that most
things can be divided into smaller things - are empirical facts that remain to this
day. Even under the assumption that these worries can somehow be resolved,
I suspect that metaphysicians would struggle to find enough cases to generate
an induction. Bird’s strategy, then, decouples methodological justification in
science from methodological justification in metaphysics by connecting justifi-
cation with empirical evidence supporting an induction with limited scope.
In order for the methodological continuation argument to succeed, Bird’s
defense must fail. The metaphysician can again look to the empiricist for ar-
guments against the inductive approach given by Bird. How is the scientific
realist justified in saying that inferences to microbes and molecules have been
subsequently confirmed by observation? The empiricist would not agree that
the technology necessary to detect microbes and molecules is epistemically on
par with observation - looking though a microscope is not an act of observing.
This reflects the well known epistemic line drawn between observable and un-
observable due to Van Fraassen (1980). The success of IBE in science cannot
be checked by observation given the empiricist definition of the term. From the
empiricist perspective, scientific realists are no better off than metaphysicians
- both are going beyond the empirical evidence in making claims about the
underlying structure of the observable phenomena. Metaphysicians can then
claim that the empirical support for realism is a red herring simply because
it never contains (observable) evidence of the reality of unobservable objects.
Again, the empiricist has proven to be an unlikely ally against the realist refu-
tation of methodological continuation, resulting in realists and metaphysicians
still sitting in the same methodological boat. The dynamics in the dialectic is
somewhat hard to follow, so it makes sense to reiterate what’s really going on.
The metaphysician and the empiricist are unlikely allies only with respect to
rejecting inherently realist defenses of IBE. The empiricist motivations for doing
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so is detached from the metaphysicians motivations: empiricists deny that we
can know that theories dealing with unobservables are true, so it makes sense
to reject an inference that promises to deliver precisely those truths; metaphysi-
cians need the methodological continuation argument to work so must deny any
defense of IBE that does not apply to metaphysics. Rejecting defenses of IBE
sui generis to realism makes sense for the metaphysician because it means that
the methodological continuation argument is still a live option. It is a live option
since realists and metaphysicians will both be in a position of attempting to jus-
tify IBE, where the hope (at least for metaphysicians) is to find a more general
defense, which would make the first premise in the methodological continuation
argument true.
4 The Galilean strategy
Perhaps realists can find what they need in Kitcher (2001), who offers another
kind of inductive argument for the reliability of IBE. The idea behind Kitcher’s
so called Galilean Strategy is to justify a method M by testing it in an epis-
temic ‘environment’ already accepted by those skeptical about M. In Galileo’s
case, this involved ensuring that the telescope delivered the truth about the
celestial by demonstrating that it delivered the truth about the terrestrial, and
that there was no principled distinction between them: induction over cases
on earth established the reliability of the telescope even when making celestial
observations. Kitcher argues that induction over success-to-truth inferences in
the observable domain gets us similar methodological justification that we can
then apply to the unobservable domain:
People find themselves in all sorts of everyday situations in which ob-
jects are temporarily inaccessible, or are inaccessible to only some
of the parties. Detectives infer the identities of criminals by con-
structing predictively successful stories about the crime, bridge play-
ers make bold contracts by arriving at predictively successful views
about the distribution of the cards, and in both instances the con-
clusions they reached can sometimes be verified subsequently. We
readily envisage an idealized type of situation, perhaps most per-
fectly realized in some parlor games, in which the “success to truth”
inference is tested and confirmed. (Kitcher 2001, 176)
Kitcher suggests that when one, in observational contexts where objects are
temporarily unobservable, entertain a host of theories some of them will prove
to be successful and others not. At some later time, when objects are no longer
temporarily unobservable, one will find out which theories were true and, ac-
cording to Kitcher, also find a strong correlation between success and truth.
The generalized argument is as follows:
(1) Success-to-truth inferences are reliable in the observable domain.
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(2) We have no good reason to suppose that it will stop working in the unob-
servable domain.
∴ Success-to-truth inferences are reliable in the unobservable domain.
The argument bears similarity to the methodological continuation argument,
but importantly only argues for the reliability of success-to-truth inferences:
the truth of a theory can be inferred only if the theory is empirically successful.
Alas, metaphysical theories are not empirically successful, at least not by any
definition of empirical success acceptable to the realist. Ladyman (2012) makes
a similar point:
[I]n so far as explanatory power is supported by its use in science and
in everyday life it is coupled to empirical and practical success [...]
We have inductive grounds for believing that pursuing simplicity and
explanatory power in science will lead to empirical success, but no
such grounds where we are dealing with distinctively metaphysical
explanations, since the latter is completely decoupled from empirical
success. (Ladyman 2012, 46)
Much like the defenses above, the Galilean strategy takes the empirical approach
inapplicable to the metaphysician, both in its formulation of the relevant infer-
ence as well as in its proposed confirmation. The question is whether or not the
metaphysician can look to empiricism for help yet again.
4.1 Reliability (dis)continued?
In a response to Kitcher, Magnus (2003) questions why the empiricist should
have to accept that the lack of a defeater for the continued reliability of success-
to-truth inferences from observable to unobservable entities provide reason to
believe that this reliability holds. There is, in fact, no reason for empiricists to
accept that it does.6 Empiricists may simply dispute that the truth of the sec-
ond premise in Kitcher’s argument is enough to warrant the conclusion. Since
we have no empirical evidence to support the use of IBE with respect to unob-
servables, there is no reason to suppose that IBE with respect to unobservables
work. Lacking a reason to believe ¬A is not a reason to believe A.
It’s clear that Magnus’ objection cannot be used by the metaphysician in
order to collapse the issues of justifying IBE in science and metaphysics. The
first part of Kitcher’s argument, that IBE is reliable with respect to observables,
is conceded to by the empiricist. Magnus’ objection is premised on the possi-
bility that the reliability of IBE is context-dependent, or local, and that realists
need to provide evidence for its reliability in the relevant context, in their case
the context of unobservables. The metaphysician is unable to utilise this em-
piricist objection because if they do, they have to concede that the reliability
of IBE is, in fact, context-dependent, which undermines the whole point of the
6Despite Kitcher referring to such empiricist denial as ‘the height of metaphysical hubris’.
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methodological continuation argument. We might, in order to conceptualise
context-dependence, partition the levels of reality that each instance of IBE is
proposed to be reliable with respect to. Empiricists are fine with IBE being re-
liable in the observable domain, scientific realists claim that reliability extends
to unobservables indispensable for empirical success, and metaphysicians claim
that reliability extends even further to include numbers, sets and relations (or
abstracta, in general). A presupposition in the methodological continuation ar-
gument is that no such partition is relevant to the justification of IBE, which
is precisely what is supposed to warrant the step from the antecedent to the
consequent in the first premise. But as Magnus’ points out, this must be argued
for, not merely presumed. The metaphysician is unable to echo the empiricist
objection in order to collapse the issue of justifying IBE in science with jus-
tifying IBE in metaphysics, which ultimately renders the first premise in the
methodological continuation argument false: even if IBE is truth-conducive in
science, it does not follow that it is truth-conducive in metaphysics.
There are few attractive options left for metaphysicians seeking justification
by methodological continuation, but one of them might be to join Magnus in his
empiricist critique of the Galilean Strategy. One reason why they might want
to do so, in spite the fact that it undermines methodological continuation, is
that it levels the playing field by weakening the realist justification of IBE in
science. The hope, even if slight, is that realists will be forced to abandon the
Galilean Strategy at which point methodological continuity is a live option once
more.
Realists now face a dilemma of sorts. Their first option, if they wish for
their defense of IBE to be accepted, is to argue against Magnus. But this would
require them to show that the reliability of IBE in one context is enough to show
that IBE is reliable in general. If they succeed, then their own approach may be
used by metaphysicians to argue from methodological continuation. The second
option is to find empirical evidence for a local justification of IBE with respect
to unobservables. This option, if successful, would not be subject to Magnus’
objection and would not be directly applicable to metaphysics. This is because
the subject matter in much of metaphysical discourse is so far removed from
the empirical context in which it would need to be tested that it seems to be a
virtually impossible task for metaphysicians to solve. Realists are arguably in
a better position. In the next section, I will examine an argument that seeks to
explore the possibilities of justifying IBE locally with respect to unobservables
in science.
5 Defending inferences to unobservables
What could an empirical defense of IBE with respect to unobservables in sci-
ence look like? In so far as the realist aim is to convince the empiricist while
at the same time not overshoot its metaphysical implications, it would have
to contain empirical evidence that empiricists find acceptable, meaning observ-
able evidence. While it may sound as if realists searching for observational
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evidence of unobservables are conceptually confused, this depends on the rel-
evant definition of unobservables. As we saw earlier, Bird argued that some
entities that were considered unobservable became observable through techno-
logical advances. We also saw that on van Fraassen’s definition of observability,
this was not acceptable. If the entities cannot be observed with the naked eye,
they are not observable. If, however, there are cases where an entity has tran-
sitioned from being considered an unobservable (or theoretical) entity to being
considered an observable (or empirical) entity, this should suffice to convince
the empiricist about the legitimacy of IBE with respect to entities considered
unobservable. This is so because in such cases realists have the means to eval-
uate the success of an inference to an entity considered unobservable that an
empiricist accept. This gives them empirical evidence of inferences to entities
considered unobservable. As a case-study of what such a transition may look
like, I will use Marie Curie’s discovery of radium.
5.1 Marie Curie’s inference to radium
In 1896, Henri Becquerel made a serendipitous discovery. He found out that
uranium emanated a strange radiation the origin of which was internal to the
substance itself. In light of the earlier exciting discovery of x-rays by Wilhelm
Röntgen, Becquarel’s discovery, although relevant, was perceived as peripheral.
It was Marie Curie that decided to investigate whether the somewhat underap-
preciated issue of uranium radiation was actually sui generis to uranium. She
proceeded to test all the elements known at the time and discovered that in
addition to uranium, thorium also radiated in the same way. Continuing her
investigations, Curie decided to test several different chemical compounds of
the elements and found out that the amount of radiation was invariant with
respect to molecular structure. It did not matter if the uranium was in the
form of a crystal or a powder - the radiation was constant. This lead her to
realize that radiation was a property of the structure of the atom, as opposed
to the structure of the molecules Langevin-Joliot (1998) The next step in her
research was to analyse the mineral compounds, or ores, from which uranium
and thorium was extracted. It was when doing this work that a puzzling re-
sult came about. The measured radiation from a pure uranium sample was
significantly lower than the radiation from the compound mineral from which
the uranium was extracted. Since her earlier results showed that the amount
of radiation corresponds to the amount of uranium, this result is inexplicable.
Marie Curie inferred that there must be an additional element with radiation
properties present in the ore which must have been discarded in the process of
extracting the uranium.
At this point, we may reflect on two points. The first is that the nature
of the additional element is derived via theory and past experimental knowl-
edge. It is Curie’s realisation that radiation is an atomic property that rules
out the possibility that the high levels of radiation could be due to some partic-
ular molecular structure in the ore. What this means is that the hypothesized
element is theoretical at this point, meaning that its stipulation and nature is
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embedded in, and connected to, theory. The second is that Curie infers the
existence of the entity based on the fact that it best explains the experimental
results. Based on the experimental facts and background theory, she has drawn
a conclusion based on explanatory considerations.
Proceeding in her research Curie decides to test her hypothesis. The stan-
dard process of testing any claims of discovering novel elements at the time was
spectroscopic analysis. Every known element could be distinguished from each
other by spectroscopic analysis because the elements reflected unique patterns
of spectral lines in the machine. If Curie’s hypothesis was right, then a unique
line associated with the new element would show up in the analysis. Spectrum
specialist Eugène-Anatole Demarçay conducted the test and concluded that:
It does not seem possible to me that this line can be attributed to
any known element [...] Neither barium nor lead from elsewhere
[i.e. from sources other than the Curies’ material], as I have assured
myself, give any line which coincides with it. (Demarçay 1898, 175-
178)
Strong evidence not only for Curie’s hypothesis, but also for the inference that
lead her to it. Alas, this evidence is not of the kind needed to persuade an
empiricist. The inference is still to a theoretical, unobservable, entity. Despite
this fact, the Curies took the evidence to imply the existence of radium:
The various reasons which we have just enumerated lead us to believe
that the new radioactive substance contains a new element to which
we propose to give the name radium. (Curie et al. 1898, 1216)
Curie had the same problem of persuading her contemporary colleagues in the
scientific community. There would need to be hard evidence that radium ac-
tually existed. As a response to the demands from the scientific community,
the Curies started the long and tedious process of isolating radium, an under-
taking that would take several years and intense labour. In August 1902, after
chemically processing 8 tons of the ore pitchblende, the Curies had managed to
produce 1 decigram of pure radium chloride.7 The scientific result of this ardu-
ous process was that Curie’s hypothesis was proven right, but we may extract
useful philosophical results from the process as well.
One of the philosophical results is that we have a case where an entity has
gone from being considered a theoretical postulate to becoming an empirical
quantity. The other philosophical result is methodological confirmation. The
inference used by Curie gets empirical support from the fact that the inferred
hypothesis was empirically proven by observational evidence. The question is
if the inference should be construed as an inference to the unobservable or
to the observable. It is clear that at the time the inference was made, the
inferred entity was considered a theoretical postulate. It is also clear that the
7Marie Curie and André Debierne would some years later also manage to isolate radium
in its metallic form from a solution of radium chloride using electrolysis (Ropp (2012)).
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background theories provides no information about the observability of radium.
It was possible, from a theoretical perspective, that radium was an extremely
unstable and volatile element, so any attempt to isolate it would’ve failed. In
this sense, and at that time, the inference was to an unobservable. However,
this goes against the characterization of observability given by van Fraassen:
X is observable if there are circumstances which are such that, if
X is present to us under those circumstances, then we observe it
(Van Fraassen 1980, 16)
Notice that the above characterization lacks a criterion for knowing if there are
circumstances in which X is observable. It only says that if it is true that there
are such circumstances, then X is observable whether we know it or not. An
empiricist might then say that radium was observable all along simply because
there were circumstances such that X was present to us in those circumstances,
though this fact about the observability of radium was only known to us after
Curie’s research had been made. It was a category mistake to consider radium
unobservable or theoretical. Therefore, the discovery of radium does not lend
itself to an empirical justification of inferences to unobservables. The focus of
the debate has now shifted to the unobservable/observable distinction. In this
debate, realists can of course ask if the distinction between the observable and
the unobservable is really the salient epistemic divide that empiricists need it
to be. Here, they might reiterate the points made by Churchland (1985) and
Maxwell (1962). They may also question whether the distinction even makes
any sense at all. It is certainly logically possible for all entities to be like Curie’s
radium so that there always are circumstances in which an entity is observable
to us, we are just ignorant about the particular circumstances. Our ignorance
about the relevant circumstances may cause us to consider certain entities to
be unobservable, but as Curie’s case shows we can certainly be wrong about
such judgments. In such a situation, empiricists would be correct to say that
we should limit epistemic commitment to observables, but it would be a trivial
claim since many of the entities which in that case are observable would have
been previously categorised as unobservable by the empiricist and therefore an
unfit subject for rational belief. If so, the real question is whether we can have
justified beliefs about entities prior to knowing that they are observable. The
Curie case shows that we can.
We may now reflect on how the Curie case bears on the metaphysicians
methodological continuity gambit. In light of Magnus’ objection to the Galilean
Strategy, the metaphysician faced two choices: i) accept that the Galilean Strat-
egy justifies IBE in science but not in metaphysics, or ii) join the empiricist
objection against the Galilean Strategy. The first option is undesirable for
self-explanatory reasons, and the second one is undesirable because the core in
the empiricist objection undermines the methodological continuation argument.
Nevertheless, option two would force the realist to either: a) provide a reason
to think that a local justification of IBE is sufficient for thinking that IBE is
globally reliable, or; b) provide a local justification for IBE with respect to en-
tities considered unobservable. Since option a would support the reasoning in
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the methodological continuation argument, realists with nominalist inclinations
would be wiser to choose option b. The Curie case is an example of what option b
could look like. It aims to establish that explanatory inferences made to entities
considered theoretical or unobservable were confirmed empirically when those
entities were discovered to be observable. While the debate about the epistemic
merit of the observable/unobservable distinction has not yet settled, the impor-
tant take-away point is that the debate about the justification of IBE in science
is no longer an issue separated from the observable/unobservable issue, but very
much a part of it. This is a debate in which metaphysicians has no stake. The
kind of entities which metaphysicians trade in will not be able to become em-
pirically detected, although it would certainly be worth reconsidering this point
if sets and universals turned out to be empirical quantities. The debate is no
longer about the applicability of IBE, but about the observable/unobservable
distinction and its epistemic significance for the empirical justification of IBE
in science. Solving any problems related to that distinction is of no help to the
metaphysician, since the issue of justifying IBE in metaphysics is orthogonal to
it.
6 Disagreement and metaphysical knowledge
Another argument against the prospects of the methodological continuation ar-
gument is that even if it is conceded, this does not mean that we have metaphys-
ical knowledge. Suppose that you would ask scientists which scientific theories
that you should accept or what entities you should think are real. Most of them
would give you a list consisting of roughly the same answers: atoms, genes,
cells, planets, tectonic plates, general relativity, theory of evolution, chemical
bonds, et.c. There is agreement amongst scientist with respect to many sci-
entific theories. The process of scientific knowledge progresses by experiment,
evidential analysis, theory revision, and unification. This process ultimately
leads to a convergence of accepting a subset of scientific theories that have been
well tested and confirmed. As a consequence, scientists are also in a position
to evaluate the success of their employed explanatory reasoning in this process.
In short, scientists mostly agree about the set of knowledge obtained from the
scientific study of the world. Now suppose you would ask metaphysicians which
metaphysical theories that you should accept or what entities you should be-
lieve are real. Most of them would give you a unique list of their own favoured
theories - some would argue that you should believe in the theory of universals,
others in trope theory; some would argue that the true theory of metaphysical
composition is gunky, others would insist its funky, et.c. The process of gaining
metaphysical knowledge does not proceed by experiment or evidential analysis
and consequently metaphysicians do not converge on what theory that actually
best explains some set of facts. This discrepancy reveals two rather striking
ways in which science is essentially different to metaphysics with respect to pro-
viding knowledge about the world: i) while scientists do employ IBE, it is only
one of many different epistemic dimensions in science. While IBE matters in
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the process of gaining scientific knowledge, it is not sufficient to do so. This is
clear from the fact that even though particle physicists had trust in the Higgs
hypothesis in virtue of its explanatory power, they still built the largest, most
expensive, most complex machine in the history of humanity to test it;8 ii) the
fact that science can pursue a plurality of methodology means that they can
update and fine-tune the epistemic details of each method. In the case of IBE,
scientists can assess the explanatory virtues they use by checking how well they
perform when subsequently testing the theories experimentally. This is a non-
starter for metaphysicians. Remarkably, Paul considers the lack of convergence
in metaphysics a virtue:
In ontology, because of the large size of the class of empirically ad-
equate competitors, it is rare to have the application of theoretical
desiderata winnow down the field to a single theory. There are usu-
ally a number of remaining competitors, each of which exhibit some
combination of theoretical virtues combined with varying ways of ac-
commodating the basic characteristics that are supposed to compose
the empirical data. A bonus of this situation, not to be underesti-
mated, is the value of epistemic diversity or disagreement: having
different acceptable theories in competition with each other can con-
tribute to the depth and quality of our overall ontological account
of the world. (Paul 2012, 22)
Paul is arguing that epistemic diversity, or epistemic disagreement, possibly
contributes positively to depth and quality of ontology, but fails to explain how,
other than hinting at the idea that theoretical rivalry necessarily leads to better
theories. It is unclear how we are supposed to evaluate which theory is better
if they are all still empirically underdetermined exhibiting some combination of
theoretical virtues. I would argue that this disagreement undercuts, rather than
supports, the idea of epistemic realism in metaphysics that Paul is advocating:
The metaphysical realist’s theory of the fundamental natures of the
world is indirectly confirmed by its success as a theory that fits with
ordinary experience and by how well it fits with other well-accepted
theories, including empirically confirmed scientific theories. (Paul
2012, 19)
If indirect confirmation via fittingness is to have any epistemic leverage at all,
it must not be the case that a substantial number of metaphysical theories
all fit ordinary experience, well-confirmed scientific theory and display some
combination of theoretical virtues. But that is precisely what disagreement
shows is the case. If we are supposed to be metaphysical realists because meta-
physicians use methodology warranted in science, then this methodology better
produce convergence with respect to the metaphysics we are supposed to be
realist about. The lack of convergence amongst metaphysicians shows that even
8For an excellent analysis of this trust see Dawid (2017).
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if the methodological continuity argument succeeds, there would be no agreed
upon set of metaphysical knowledge on offer when asked what we should be
realists about. It also shows that the underlying problem in metaphysics is
lack of external methodological validation. There is no neutral, or additional,
methodological vantage point from which to evaluate or assess the success of
IBE in metaphysics. This fact explains the lack of convergence. The challenge
for the metaphysician, in order to convince scientific realists that there is meta-
physical knowledge, is to show that the following argument is true: If IBE is
truth-conducive in metaphysics, and if metaphysicians converge on theories us-
ing IBE, then there is metaphysical knowledge. In what I have argued, scientific
realists have reason to think that neither conjunct is true.
7 Summary
I have argued that the scientific realist have good reason to discard the meta-
physicians’ argument from methodological continuity. I argued that the meta-
physician seeking to piggyback on the realist defense of IBE in science by in-
voking methodological continuation presupposed that the defense is straightfor-
wardly applicable to metaphysics. As we have seen, it is not. The favoured
defenses of IBE in scientific realism make extensive use of empirical considera-
tions, predictive power and inductive evidence, all of which are paradigmatically
absent in the metaphysical context. While the metaphysician is able to use some
empiricist objections to refute empirical defenses of IBE, not all such objections
can be used to collapse the issues of justifying IBE in science with justifying
IBE in metaphysics. Particularly troublesome was Magnus’ objection which,
if accepted, undermined the methodological continuation argument. I also ex-
plored a case-study of Curie’s inference to the existence of radium as a possible
way for realists to counter Magnus’ objection without inadvertently support-
ing methodological continuation. The case turned on the epistemic salience of
the observable/unobservable distinction by van Fraassen. Solving any problems
related to that distinction is of no help to the metaphysicians methodologi-
cal continuation argument, since the issue of justifying IBE in metaphysics is
orthogonal to the distinction.
Furthermore, I argued that the metaphysician, even if the realist would con-
cede to the methodological continuation argument, failed to offer any agreed
upon conclusions resulting from its application in metaphysics. The fact that
metaphysicians disagree about which metaphysical theory that provides the best
explanation shows that, even when granted a sound methodology, its applica-
tion in metaphysics has been unsuccessfully executed.
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